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Abstract
The paper studies theoretically how the optimal contract in the hidden-
action moral hazard is aﬀected when an agent feels bad when not reaching
a target eﬀort set in the contract. Agent’s guilt or grief about not reaching
the target makes eﬀort partially contractible even without any monitor-
ing. Not surprisingly, higher eﬀort can be implemented with lower risk
and the solution is closer to ﬁrst-best.
Nevertheless, using the target to induce eﬀort is not entirely cost-
less for the principal. In equilibrium, the agent’s eﬀort falls short of the
target. This induces guilt which must be compensated for by the princi-
pal, for otherwise the agent would not accept the job in the ﬁrst place.
Thus, although the principal’s payoﬀ is higher, the agent receives a part
of the monetary rents accruing to intrinsic motivation. This result dif-
fers markedly from those in previous contributions on contracting with an
agent with social preference or pro-social motivation.
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11 Introduction
“Then I thought a minute and says to myself: Hold’on. S’pose you’d done right
and give Jim up. Would you felt better than you do now? No, says I. I’d feel
just the same I feel now. Well then, I says. What’s the use of learning to do
the right when doing right is troublesome and there is no trouble doing wrong
and the wages is just the same. I was stuck. I could not answer that. So I
reckoned. I would no more bother about it but after this do always whichever
comes handiest at time.” (Mark Twain: Huckleberry Finn).
The quotation above was put forward by Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom (1987) to
highlight Huckleberry’s rational reasoning that leads him to choose an action
that is the best in terms of wages and ease of use. With a ﬂat wage scheme,
there is no reason to provide eﬀort. The quotation leads us to the roots of
the problem of providing incentives to a risk-averse agent: paying more when
the output is high provides incentives to work hard, but if output depends on
other factors than the agent’s eﬀort, a risk-averse agent must be compensated
for accepting the risk. Yet, the quotation also highlights Huckleberry’s trade-oﬀ
between choosing the right, or the socially desirable, against choosing ‘whichever
comes handiest at time’. Huckleberry reasons that when both doing right and
doing wrong make him feel equally good about himself, the best choice is the
one that takes least eﬀort.
Huckleberry goes further and asks himself: ‘What’s the use of doing the
right...?’ In other words, can Huckleberry gain in pecuniary terms from feeling
better about doing the ‘right’ or promoting the good of society? Huckleberry
reasons that the answer must be ‘no’: preference for choosing the right only
prevents him from choosing the handiest at time and, hence, such preferences
cannot pay oﬀ.
Building on the single dimensional hidden action moral hazard model (Holm-
str¨ om, 1979), I illustrate that Huckleberry’s answer may be incorrect: when the
preference for doing right is observed by the principal, it provides commitment
power. If Huckleberry is known to prefer to do as agreed, an agreement on how
much eﬀort Huckleberry should provide is no longer cheap talk and can be used
as a riskless alternative to a high-powered incentive scheme to induce eﬀort. I
show that an agent who feels bad about doing wrong earns a better pay in terms
of the certainty equivalent, even if her monetary incentives to provide eﬀort are
lower.
Formally, I introduce two additional features into the model of Holmstr¨ om
2(1979). First, the contract oﬀer made by the principal includes an explicit target
eﬀort level in addition to the monetary incentive scheme. In the standard model,
this target eﬀort is mere cheap talk with no impact and thus left unmodelled.
The second new and a very much related ingredient is that the agent may have
a preference for clear conscience: she suﬀers a cost if she fails to meet the target.
Since guilt makes talk costly, the target may have a direct impact on eﬀort.
The target eﬀort might refer to an informal non-binding mutual agreement
between the principal and the agent or a goal assigned to the worker. The pos-
itive impact of promises on eﬃciency and on the principal’s payoﬀs has been
recently empirically documented by Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) and Van-
berg (2008), and modeled by the former as well as Dufwenberg and Battigalli
(2007, 2009) and Miettinen (2006). The positive impact on eﬀort of non-binding
non-incentivized goals has been widely documented and theorized by psycholo-
gists (Locke and Latham, 2002; Latham and Locke, 2007).
Guilt makes eﬀort partially contractible even without monitoring. Yet sur-
prisingly, using the target eﬀort as an incentive mechanism is not entirely costless
for the principal. The optimal agreement asks for an unoptimally high eﬀort
from Huckleberry (from his perspective) and the bad feelings about not meet-
ing the target must be compensated for by the principal so that Huckleberry is
willing to accept the contract. However, since the adopted incentive scheme is
less risky than one which does not take advantage of Huckleberry’s moral pref-
erences, Huckleberry’s employer gets higher earnings than if Huckleberry felt
equally good about doing right and doing wrong and, moreover, Huckleberry
earns a higher certainty equivalent, even net of the higher eﬀort he exerts. The
ﬁndings are aligned with those of experimental contract theory literature. Fehr
et al. (1997, p.849) and Fehr and Rockenbach (2003), for instance, ﬁnd that an
optimally chosen combination of higher target eﬀort and wages (above oppor-
tunistic subgame-perfect equilibrium levels) beneﬁts both the principal and the
agent, although actual eﬀort falls short of the target eﬀort. Reciprocity provides
an alternative explanation for the ﬁndings.1
Section 3 considers the case where, in addition to the agent, also the principal
is motivated by preference for doing right. Once the output has been produced,
it is in the interest of the principal not to pay the agent but rather to keep the
entire value of the output to herself. I illustrate that a principal with observable
1There is thus room for experiments that attempt to disentangle the reciprocity and guilt
eﬀects in these settings. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk and Fishbacher (2006)
provide general formalizations of reciprocity.
3preference for doing right is better oﬀ than a principal without since the latter
cannot commit to pay and, therefore, the agent provides no eﬀort or rejects the
oﬀer. As in Saloner and Rotemberg (1993), other-regarding preference provides
intrinsic commitment power to the principal which, in a context where contracts
are highly incomplete, is necessary for credible provision of incentives to the
agent.
A bulk of literature considers the eﬀects of agent’s equity concerns on optimal
contracts. The models closest to my setup are those of Englmaier and Wambach
(2005), Itoh (2004), and Dur and Glazer (2008) who consider an agent who
envies his principal. Unlike the current paper, all these models assume risk-
neutral parties and/or contractible eﬀort. Thus they build upon simpler or
diﬀerent setups than the model of Holmstr¨ om (1979). They all ﬁnd that the
principal’s equilibrium payoﬀ decreases and that of the agent increases if the
agent is more concerned about equity: When failing to produce output, the agent
can be paid according to her outside option compensation. Yet, an envious agent
must be paid more in the case of success to make sure that the principal does not
get too large a share of gross proﬁts. This paper illustrates how plausible other-
regarding preferences may have quite the opposite eﬀect on optimal contracts:
a lower powered incentive scheme beneﬁts both the agent and the principal.
The paper most related to the present one is Akerlof and Kranton (2005).
There, the principal may take measures to make the agent identify more strongly
with the ﬁrm and its goals. The ‘identity’ in their model functions like the ‘tar-
get eﬀort’ in my model since the identity is essentially a preference for doing as
the identity calls for.2 As in the present paper, the induced target provides an
alternative to the high powered incentive scheme to induce eﬀort. The model of
Akerlof and Kranton (2005), however, abstracts from the endogenous cost of in-
ducing a higher target eﬀort which is present in my model. Rather, they assume
an exogenous cost of building up corporate identity. Apart from the exogenous
costs/beneﬁts of corporate identity, the present model can be considered as a
generalization of Akerlof and Kranton (2005) which illustrates that the principal
faces a trade-oﬀ even when using the informal target is not directly costly.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the general moral
hazard model with agent having a preference for clear conscience. An example
provides some further intuition and results. Section 3 considers a principal with
proneness to guilt. Section 4 concludes.
2Alternatively, the target eﬀort might reﬂect the agent’s work ethic or a social norm which
again may be manipulated by the principal.
42 Agent with a preference for clear conscience
2.1 The general case
Let us consider Holmstr¨ om’s (1979) single-dimensional moral hazard model.
The risk-neutral principal owns a stochastic production technology. The output
level is denoted by q with support [q,q]. The principal hires an agent to control
the technology and proposes an incentive scheme s(q) to the agent. Thus the




where f(q;a) is the density function of the output q. The agent chooses ef-
fort a ∈ [0,∞) and output is drawn randomly from a distribution that is
parametrized with eﬀort. The cumulative distribution function is F(q;a). Let’s
suppose that Fa(q;a) ≤ 0 and that for every a0 > a00, Fa(q;a0) < Fa(q;a00) so
that Fa(q;a0) ﬁrst order stochastically dominates Fa(q;a00) - greater eﬀort is
more likely to result in higher output.
The agent’s utility is additively separable in money and eﬀort. A von
Neumann-Morgernstern utility function u(s(q)) captures the agent’s risk pref-
erences over wage lotteries. The agent is strictly risk-averse
u00 < 0 < u0.
The agent suﬀers a disutility of eﬀort captured by function c : R+ −→ R+ which
is increasing and convex in eﬀort and c(0) = 0,
c0,c00 > 0.
I add a behavioral component to the agent’s utility function: the agent suﬀers
disutility of guilt if she inﬂicts harm on the principal by providing less eﬀort
than agreed. This component is additively separable from the other two. For
simplicity, I assume a speciﬁc form of this disutility denoted by g such that
g : R −→ R+ g(a,a∗) = 1
2(min{a − a∗,0})2 . Thus the agent suﬀers only
if she harms the principal by falling short of the agreed target eﬀort denoted
by a∗. Notice that the disutility of guilt is increasing in the harm inﬂicted on
the principal.3 In summary the function of disutility of eﬀort of an agent with
3The truncation is made for plausibility. The results would be unchanged if rather g =
5proneness to guilt δ can be written as




where δ ∈ [0,∞) is agent’s proneness to guilt. I assume that the agent’s prefer-
ences and costs are observable to the principal. 4
The game is structured as follows. Prior to the agent’s choice, the parties
negotiate. The principal makes a take-it or leave-it proposal to the agent. This
proposal consists of two parts: a monetary incentive scheme, s(q), and a target
eﬀort, a∗. The agent can either accept or reject the contract. If an agent with a
positive proneness to guilt accepts the proposal and deviates from target eﬀort,
she will suﬀer from a guilty conscience or feels devastated by her lacking work
morale. The agent has an outside option u which captures the opportunity cost
of the agent.















(a − a∗)2 − c(a) ≥ u (2)




f . The coeﬃcient µ is positive. The eﬀort level chosen
by the agent is below the target eﬀort level. The optimal target eﬀort level
is given by a∗ = a +
µ
λ. As δ tends to inﬁnity, a∗ − a tends to zero.
1
2(a−a∗)2 was assumed as is clear from the proof of Proposition 1, equations (9) and (10) in
particular. For the sake of simplicity, I do not make guilt a function of the expected harm of
the principal explicitly.
4Alternative assumptions are discussed in the conclusion.
5The ﬁrst order approach assumes that the solution to the agent’s maximization problem
is given by the eﬀort which renders the ﬁrst derivative of the target function zero. Jewitt
(1988) provides suﬃcient conditions.
6Proof. The ﬁrst-order conditions of the Lagrangian w.r.t. a∗, s and a are given
by
∂L
∂a∗ = µδ + λδ(a − a∗) = 0 (3)
∂L
∂s





(q − s(q))fa(q;a)dq + µ{
Z
u(s(q))faa(q;a)dq − δ − c00(a)} = 0 (5)








which is greater than a when µ is positive. And from (4), it follows that
1
u0(s(q))




The latter is a result analogous to that in Holmstr¨ om (1979) and it states
that the monetary reward is increasing in the output, provided that λ and
µ are positive. Kuhn-Tucker conditions imply that λ is positive. To show that
coeﬃcient µ is positive, follow the steps in lemma 1 in Jewitt (1988). From (1)
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u0 − λ)f(q;a)dq = µ(c0(a) + δ(a − a∗)) (9)










7has the sign of covariance of 1
u0 and u. Since u and 1
u0 are monotone in the same
direction, this sign is positive. Therefore, on the left hand side of (9) µ takes
the sign of c0(a) + δ(a − a∗). That is
sgn(µ) = sgn(c0(a) + δ(a − a∗))
In addition, from (6), we get




Hence µ cannot be non-positive because with non-positive µ, the right hand
side of (10) is strictly positive and the equality does not hold. Hence, µ must
be strictly positive. This implies that
a∗ > a.
Setting a∗ ≤ a cannot be optimal since then guilt would be zero and the con-
strained optimum for a∗ ≤ a is the contract for the standard agent which was
shown above to be suboptimal if δ > 0.
Moreover, µ is given by the solution to (5). Therefore, it is straightforward
to see that as δ tends to inﬁnity, µ tends to zero. Thus, from (6), we get that
a∗ − a tends to zero as δ tends to inﬁnity.
The intuition behind this result is simple. One can consider the principal’s
strategy of setting the target eﬀort above the equilibrium eﬀort as a means of
generating intrinsic marginal gains from higher eﬀort for the agent - those of
reducing disutility of guilt. The guilt prone agent equates the marginal phys-
ical disutility of eﬀort with the marginal gains, which in this case consist of
the expected marginal increases in monetary remuneration and, in addition, of
the reduction in the marginal disutility of guilt. The higher above the actual
eﬀort the target lies, the greater the marginal intrinsic gain for the agent from
increasing eﬀort. High-powered monetary incentives and target eﬀort are thus
imperfect substitutes in inducing eﬀort where the substitutability depends on
the agents proneness to guilt. Both the high powered monetary incentives and
high targets are detrimental for the agent because strong pecuniary incentives
make income risky and because a higher target increases the total disutility of
guilt, respectively. In the optimal contract, the principal trades oﬀ the gains
and costs of using these alternative means of eliciting eﬀort.
The following corollary shows that the agent with a positive proneness to
8guilt will reach a higher certainty equivalent than a zero proneness counterpart
with equal risk attitudes even if the monetary incentives of the latter may be
higher powered. This may be surprising at ﬁrst sight. One might conjecture
that, since weaker monetary incentives induce the same or higher eﬀort, the
agent would seem to lose from a positive proneness to guilt. However, the
principal pays the agent the lowest remuneration that she still accepts. All
proneness-to-guilt types have equal wages in an outside option. In equilibrium
the agent prone to guilt suﬀers since she never reaches the target eﬀort. The
agent must be compensated for having to feel guilt and for exerting higher
eﬀort to make her accept the job in the ﬁrst place. Hence, the gain from the
monetary remuneration net of the physical disutility of eﬀort will be above the
outside option payoﬀ whereas for the zero proneness to guilt agent, this equals
the outside option payoﬀ.
Corollary 1 The certainty equivalent (gross/net of physical disutility of
eﬀort) for an agent with proneness to guilt δ ∈ (0,∞) is higher than that
of an agent with zero proneness to guilt.
Proof. It is easy to see that, in equilibrium, the agent’s gain from monetary
remuneration net of the physical disutility of eﬀort satisﬁes
Z












where aδ and a0 are the equilibrium eﬀort levels chosen by the agent with
proneness δ to clear conscience and zero proneness to guilt respectively. Also,
c(aδ) > c(a0) since aδ > a0. Hence, an agent with positive δ has a higher
certainty equivalent than an agent with the same risk attitude and with δ = 0.
Moreover also the gain from monetary remuneration net of the physical disutility
of eﬀort is greater.
Notice that principal could induce the eﬀort choice of the standard agent
from any type of agent such that even the costs and beneﬁts to both parties of
9the agreement would be invariant to the proneness to guilt type of the agent.
This would require using, for any proneness to guilt type, the same monetary
remuneration scheme as for the standard agent and setting the target eﬀort equal
to the equilibrium eﬀort of the standard agent. By choosing the equilibrium
eﬀort of the standard agent, the agent prone to guilt would thus suﬀer from no
disutility of guilt and even the expected utility apart from this term would be
maximized. Any deviation would therefore be detrimental. Since the principal
prefers using another contract when the agent is disposed to feel grief about not
reaching targets, the principal must gain from contracting with an agent whose
proneness to guilt is positive. Given Corollary 1, it is thus straightforward that
eﬃciency is higher as well.
Corollary 2 The expected payoﬀ of the principal and the social surplus
are higher when the principal faces an agent with δ > 0 than when the
principal faces an agent with δ = 0.
Proof. For each positive proneness to guilt, the principal could propose the
agent a∗ = aδ=0 the incentive scheme sδ=0(q) and get exactly the same payoﬀ
for each δ. This contract would be accepted by every type of agent since the
optimal eﬀort of each agent would then coincide with that of the agent with δ = 0
- agents with δ > 0 suﬀer even more than agents with δ = 0 from deviations from
this optimum due to their conscience preference. Thus each δ yields the same
expected payoﬀ and suﬀers no guilt. The participation constraint is satisﬁed
since it is for δ = 0.
It is shown above that proposing the optimal contract for δ = 0 to an agent
with δ > 0 is suboptimal and yet the contract for δ = 0 performs equally well for
δ = 0 and for any δ > 0. Thus, the principal must strictly gain from contracting
with δ > 0 rather than δ = 0. It is also shown that the utility of an agent with
δ > 0 is at least weakly higher than that of an agent with δ = 0 whether the
emotional term is included in the utility or not. Thus, the sum of payoﬀs is then
greater as well.
We saw above that it is proﬁtable for the principal to use target eﬀort to
induce eﬀort. This is because the target eﬀort reduces the cost of implement-
ing inframarginal units of eﬀort due to lessening the need for incentive pay
which generates risks to the risk-averse agent. Optimality, with a risk neutral
principal, requires that the expected marginal productivity of eﬀort equals the
10marginal cost of implementing it. The equilibrium eﬀort level and equilibrium
productivity will thus be higher than when the agent is not disposed to feel bad
about not reaching targets. This further increases overall welfare.
Providing monetary incentive schemes that condition pay on output or proﬁt
alleviates the agency problem between the owner of a production technology and
the agent she hires. However, the empirically observed monetary incentives are
often lower powered than theory predicts. People are paid a somewhat ﬁxed
remuneration and some targets are set despite the fact that the realized eﬀort
is not observable or enforceable. Disposition to feel grief about not reaching
targets may be one explanation. 6
Qualitatively, the results would continue to hold even if the agent was risk-
neutral and the contract was made subject to limited (zero) liability of the
agent.7 First, if the agent could walk out of the contract and receive her outside-
option payoﬀ at any time (zero liability) without having to feel guilty, then
even the limited liability constraint implies that the agent will be remunerated
for having to bear guilt since otherwise the agent would indeed walk out of
the contract when unsuccessful. It is of course somewhat implausible that the
agent could choose not to feel guilty at all by exiting. Yet, if there is guilt
about quitting ex post then it is not the liability constraint but the ex-ante
participation constraint that implies the remuneration for equilibrium guilt.
2.2 Linear-normal example
By means of an example we shall consider here a model where the incentive
scheme is restricted to a linear one and where the agent controls the mean of
a normally distributed output the variance of which does not depend on the
eﬀort. Moreover, the agent’s utility components are multiplicatively separable.
In this simple case, the optimal solution can be explicitly derived and thus it
can used to better illustrate the intuition of the model8. The assumptions of
the model are as follows:
(a) the output is normally distributed with q˜N(a,σ2)
6There are other explanations as well, such as the principal avoiding to divert the agent’s
attention away from other activities important for proﬁtability when the agent has several
tasks to carry out at the same time (Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom, 1991).
7See Sappington (1983), for instance.
8 Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom (1987) motivate this approach by showing that it is a reduced
form of a problem of incentivizing the agent who must control a technology over a longer time
interval.
11(b) the incentive scheme is linear s(q) = vq + t
(c) the physical disutility of eﬀort is written as c(a) = c
2a2
(d) the agent’s utility has a constant absolute risk aversion u(y) = −exp(−ry).
where r is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion and y = vq+t− c
2a2−δ
2(a−a∗)2.




{a + ε − v(a + ε) − t}h(ε)dε
s.t.
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where ε˜N(0,σ2) and h(.) is the density of this normal distribution. The second
















tδ = u +
(rcσ2 − 1) + δ(c + δ)(rσ2)2
2c(1 + (c + δ)rσ2)2 . (14)
From (11), it is now easy to see that the monetary incentives and the target
eﬀort are imperfect substitutes in inducing eﬀort. Moreover, an agent who is
more prone to guilt is less responsive to monetary incentives than a standard
agent since the former, rather than equating the marginal disutility of eﬀort to
the marginal expected monetary gain, also takes into account the diminishing
marginal disutility of falling behind the target as eﬀort increases. Thus, while
at optimum the guilt-prone agent typically exerts more eﬀort than a standard
12agent, the diminishing marginal disutility of guilt implies that the agent is less
responsive to monetary incentives.
Independently of the agent’s proneness to guilt, the principal sets the target
eﬀort equal to the ﬁrst best eﬀort of the agent9. The agent prone to guilt is
oﬀered a lower bonus rate than the agent with zero proneness to guilt.
The target eﬀort is always above the equilibrium eﬀort:
a∗
δ − aδ =
rσ2
(1 + (c + δ)rσ2)
> 0. (15)
and ﬁxed remuneration for the guilt prone agent is higher and, yet, the guilt-
prone agent chooses a higher eﬀort level than the agent without proneness to
guilt. The risk neutral principal bears a larger share of the risk, which further
improves eﬃciency.
The agent’s certainty equivalent must exceed the payoﬀ of her best outside
option. In optimum, the certainty equivalent is equal to the outside option
payoﬀ:




















δ is the agent’s material payoﬀ. Thus the
diﬀerence between the certainty equivalents net of physical disutility of eﬀort
between a guilt-prone agent and a standard agent is merely Π(δ) ≡ δ
2(aδ −a∗
δ)2.
Plugging (15) into δ
2(aδ − a∗
δ)2 we obtain the diﬀerence
Π(δ) =
δ(rσ2)2
2(1 + (c + δ)rσ2)2 > 0.




whereas clearly for δ > 0, Π(δ) > 0.
One can also make the remark that it does not pay oﬀ for the agent to
have too large a proneness to guilt. If the disposition to disutility of guilt is
too important relative to that to the physical disutility of eﬀort, the agent will
not miss the target by a large margin. Thus disutility of guilt will ultimately
be vanishing in the agent’s proneness to guilt and so will be her share of the
9The ﬁrst-best is given by arg maxa E(q|a) − c(a), or equivalently a = 1
c.




which maximizes the certainty equivalent net of physical disutility of eﬀort.
3 Principal with preference for clear conscience
In this section, we shall consider a scenario where the principal does not have
any exogenous commitment device that guarantees that she will ex post pay
according to the contract that she oﬀers ex ante. Instead, the agent may be held
up and paid less than agreed when the output is produced and the payment is
due. Naturally, guilt about not paying as agreed provides the principal with an
intrinsic partial commitment device if this preference is observed by the agent
ex ante when the contract is oﬀered.
There are three stages in the game. First, the principal and the agent agree
on an incentive scheme s∗(q). In the second stage given the principal’s proneness
to guilt and the incentive scheme s∗(q), the agent chooses eﬀort a and the
stochastic output q is produced according to F(q;a).10 In the third stage, the
principal pays out the actual remuneration s(q) which may be conditioned on
the output.
The principal’s disposition to grief is modelled in the following manner. The
principal is assumed to suﬀer from guilt if her ex-post payment to the agent,
s(q), is smaller than the amount indicated in the agreed-upon incentive scheme,
s∗(q). The disutility of guilt is increasing in the harm inﬂicted on the agent
such that g : R −→ R+ and g(s,s∗) = 1
2(min{s−s∗,0})2 where s is the actual
payment paid out to the agent when output is produced and s∗ is the payment
promised to the agent when contracting. Thus, given q, the principal’s ex-post










10For simplicity, we assume that the agent is a standard one throughout this section.
14where πP(q,s) = q − s is the material payoﬀ and δP
2 (min{0,s − s∗(q)})2 is the
principal’s disutility of guilt. If δP ∈ (0,∞), the problem admits an interior
solution




whereas the principal with no disposition to bad feelings about breaching chooses
s(q) = 0 for all q.
Let’s now turn attention to the agent’s optimal eﬀort. Given that the dis-
position characteristics of the principal are observable, the agent perfectly an-
ticipates the lack of commitment of the principal and foresees the bias given
in (16). Thus, the principal with δP ∈ (0,∞) can implement the scheme of a
fully committed principal ˆ s(q) by setting s∗
δ(q) ≡ ˆ s(q) + 1
δP . Let us denote the
agent’s optimal eﬀort choice under the scheme ˆ s(q) by ˆ a. Indeed, notice that if
dispositional commitment power approaches full commitment power δP → ∞,
then s∗(q) → ˆ s(q). It is easy to see that for every δP ∈ (0,∞) this constitutes
the ex-ante optimal scheme if the principal decides to contract at all. It is
also easy to see that all principals with δP ∈ (0,∞) receive exactly the same
expected monetary payoﬀ πP ≡
R q
q (q − ˆ s(q))f(q;ˆ a)dq.
Consider now the contracting phase. To ﬁx ideas, suppose that the princi-
pal has a disposition-independent alternative use for the assets she owns with
expected return πP, such as selling the assets or controlling the production
technology oneself. The equilibrium disutility of guilt is, perhaps surprisingly,
a decreasing function of the principal’s proneness to guilt and equals 1
δP . Thus
the disposition to guilt may inﬂuence the principal’s optimal choice between hir-
ing an agent or allocating the assets to the alternative use. To see this, denote
by δP the proneness to guilt type of the principal who is indiﬀerent between
oﬀering the contract to the agent and choosing the outside option. This type is
implicitly given by
R q
q (q − ˆ s(q))f(q;ˆ a)dq − 1




q (q − ˆ s(q))f(q;ˆ a)dq − πP
.
A principal with δP < δP will refrain from hiring an agent altogether since her
expected utility is below her expected return in the outside option.
Finally, any credible incentive scheme is out of reach of the principal with
zero proneness to guilt. The agent correctly anticipates that the principal will
not pay anything in any case. So the agent will choose her outside option u.
15Proposition 2 The expected monetary return for the principal with δP ≤
δP is πP and the expected monetary return for the principal with δP > δP
is πP where πP > πP. The expected utility of the principal with δP ≤ δP
equals πP. The utility of the principal is increasing in δP in [δP,∞) and
limδ→∞
R q
q UP(q, ˆ s(q),s∗
δ(q);δ)f(q;ˆ a)dq = πP.
4 Discussion
Recent experimental evidence from controlled laboratory experiments indicates
that people tend to avoid breaching informal promises (Charness and Dufwen-
berg, 2006; Vanberg, 2008). Psychologists in turn have shown that speciﬁc
non-binding targets increase performance more than just urging people to do
their best (Locke and Latham, 2002). These ﬁndings may accrue to the ten-
dency of feeling guilt or grief about not keeping promises and meeting targets.
In this paper, I have theoretically studied the eﬀects of preference for clear con-
science on equilibrium contracts and behavior in a hidden action moral hazard
setup.
As for the results, when facing an agent prone to guilt, the principal ﬁnds
it proﬁtable to set the target eﬀort above the equilibrium eﬀort of the agent
and to use equilibrium guilt to better incentivize the agent. Because the agent
must be compensated suﬃciently for the grief to accept the job, an agent prone
to guilt receives a higher certainty equivalent gross/net of physical disutility of
eﬀort than an agent with zero proneness to guilt. On the other hand, a principal
who is prone to guilt receives higher earnings than one not prone to guilt when
there is no exogenous device that commits the principal to her contract oﬀer: an
agent who fears being held up and paid nothing will not accept the contract.11
The results can also be approached from the angle of contracting under pro-
social motivation (Francois and Vlassopoulos, 2007). The target might reﬂect
the socially optimal action, especially if production generates unmodeled pos-
itive externalities on third parties. The principal might then be in a position
of manipulating social cues that easily trigger the agent’s pro-social motivation
to work harder. Pro-social cuing of a task with positive externalities on third
11Bester and Strauss (2001) analyze such commitment problems in a setting where the
initial contract oﬀer restricts the set of actual payments.
16parties strengthens latent pro-social identity so that the socially optimal eﬀort
becomes the focal target. A row of papers have established results on improved
risk-sharing, lower-powered incentives, and lower total monetary compensation
for pro-socially motivated agents (see Francois, 2001, for instance). The present
paper suggests that if guilt motivation is important among pro-socially moti-
vated agents, then all monetary rents from pro-social motivation may not accrue
to the principal but the agent yields a higher compensation than in tasks where
pro-social cuing is infeasible.
In this paper the focus has been limited to the implications of clear conscience
preferences on optimal contracts. This class of preferences is empirically well-
documented in controlled economic experiments. Yet, an interesting extension
of the present model would allow agents being proud of exceeding their targets,
in addition to feeling bad about not reaching them. In accordance with other
behavioral domains (Tversky and Kahneman, 1979; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999),
where people have been found to perceive losses more salient than gains, the
marginal pride in the gain domain would perhaps be best modeled smaller than
the marginal guilt in the loss domain. If both gains and losses are concave, the
principal would face a trade-oﬀ between easier targets which the agent would
surpass and more challenging targets that the agent would never reach. The
former would be less expensive for the principal but would also imply weaker
intrinsic incentives whereas the latter provide strong incentives, yet with a cost
to the principal. Thus, depending on the production technology, the former or
the latter class of targets may be optimal.
Despite the loss in parsimony and the lack of rigorous experimental eco-
nomics research on pride, the extension to the gains domain suggests itself in
psychological goal-setting theory (Latham and Locke, 2007) where satisfaction
over beating the targets plays an important role. Psychologists argue that
persistent falling short of targets reduces empathy towards the employer over
time. Thus guilt based incentives are likely to be of limited applicability in dy-
namic contexts. Anecdotal evidence from investment banking and consultancy
agencies suggests that targets superior to equilibrium eﬀort have been used,
especially for those in early phase of their career path. Due to the interest of
screening out and inducing the exit of worst performers when agent’s type is
private information, targets with equilibrium guilt may be a part of an optimal
strategy after all provided that some types can reach the targets. In contrast,
satisfaction about beating targets is argued to improve empathy over time and
thus easy targets provide the added value of aligning the agent’s incentives with
17those of the organization in future interaction.12
In this paper, for simplicity, it is assumed that the agent’s proneness to guilt
and his skill is fully observable. Yet, in the light of Frank (1987), the results
could be generalized to allow for only partial observability of clear conscience
preferences. Further research is certainly needed in order to understand how
non-pecuniary motivation, including the motivation suggested in this paper,
twists incentives and inﬂuences optimal contracts.
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